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Illinois ended 2011 with a better financial
situation than it faced a year earlier. How-
ever, the state began the year with a hole so
deep that not even a massive tax increase
and drastic spending cuts could come close
to filling it. In this chapter, we use a care-
fully constructed model of the Illinois
budget and detailed database about past
revenue and expenditures to develop pro-
jections of future fiscal balance. This analy-
sis delivers what is, perhaps, the headline
message from our work: We find that main-
taining increased income tax rates after they
are scheduled to expire and extreme auster-
ity with respect to spending could bring Illi-
nois into fiscal balance by Fiscal Year 2019.
We neither endorse nor reject this scenario
but believe that it provides a useful baseline
against which alternative fiscal plans can be
measured.
Unfortunately, Illinois’ accounting and
budgeting practices have not promoted
good fiscal behavior and sometimes ob-
scure the nature and extent of its fiscal
challenges. Illinois still has about $4 billion
in unpaid General Funds bills, and no fi-
nancial plan to deal with the backlog.1 A
major tax increase in January 2011 brought
increased income tax receipts, but federal
aid is down because the national stimulus
plan has ended. General Funds spending
was capped at 2 percent, but Illinois has
more than 600 other funds that have no
cap on growth. The state comptroller’s
website reports the deficits in the General
Revenue Fund, but no one officially re-
ports deficits in the non-General Funds.2
It took years of avoiding tough fiscal
choices and a brutal recession to get Illi-
nois’ finances into such a mess. Denial,
borrowing, one-time revenue, and other
short-term solutions delayed the reckon-
ing, but eventually the severity of the un-
derlying problems restricted the state’s
cash flow and it became difficult to con-
duct day-to-day operations. This dire cir-
cumstance has penetrated the public and
political consciousness. The tax increases
and spending growth caps have been huge
steps in the right direction, but other re-
cent efforts to deal with the fiscal crisis
have not been productive.
A number of proposals to expand revenue
or cut spending are on the table, but as of
this writing3 none has passed. Major gam-
bling expansion plans have been fiercely
debated, but not yet enacted. Proposals to
restructure public-employee pensions, lay
off state workers, and close state-run
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1 In October 2011 the Comptroller’s Office reported that in July, 2011, the bill backlog was $3.798 billion, and since
that time“the Office has received $1.34 billion in FY 2011 bills. That means more than $5.1 billion in FY 2012
revenues will be used to pay off last year’s bills.”The outstanding liabilities above and beyond the $3.8 billion
backlog include “unaddressed Medicaid bills, unpaid state employee health insurance bills and unpaid corporate
income tax refunds held by the state agencies. Beyond those challenges, the GRF owes approximately $486
million to other state funds to pay back FY 2011 interfund borrowing, of which approximately $350 million is due
to be repaid in FY 2012.” Illinois Office of the Comptroller. Comptroller’s Quarterly. Edition 41, October 2011 (pages
1-2.) http://www.ioc.state.il.us/index.cfm/resources/comptrollers-quarterly/; down from the $6.4 billion in the
January 2011 report (Edition 38).
2 For the General Revenue Fund balance see http://www.ioc.state.il.us/index.cfm/fiscal-condition/fiscal-condition/.
3 Late November 2011, after the fall veto session of the General Assembly.
facilities have raised numerous legal issues
and it could be years before these plans—if
implemented—would save the state any
money. Governor Pat Quinn, a Democrat,
has proposed additional borrowing to pay
down the state’s overdue bills, arguing
that the state has already spent this money,
but these plans have been opposed by Re-
publican leaders. Borrowing is becoming
increasingly costly as Illinois’ bond rating
has been repeatedly downgraded, result-
ing in higher interest rates to sell the state’s
debt. As a result, social service providers,
physicians, pharmacies, schools and other
vendors that do business with the state
continue to wait for payment.
A lack of clarity in the presentation of the
state’s finances further complicates the situ-
ation. Without an accurate assessment of
the problem, it is all but impossible to make
progress toward a solution. Although most
people can agree that government trans-
parency and accountability are laudable
ideals, how do we know when a state’s fi-
nancial reports are transparent? Illinois has
a lot of information posted on its websites,
which give it high marks from some online
transparency advocates, but in a recent 50-
state study we found that Illinois is one of
the least transparent states because of its
practice of moving expenditure items be-
tween the General Funds and special funds
budgets from one year to the next.
This chapter is divided into four sections.
First, we review the events of the past year,
beginning with the January tax hike,
which—as our analysis shows—does not
completely close Illinois’ budget gap. Sec-
ond, we present our latest long-term projec-
tions from the Fiscal Futures Model for three
different policy scenarios. These scenarios












Illinois will require extraordinary willpower
and careful fiscal monitoring. We then dis-
cuss our recent study of budget transparency
that shows Illinois compares unfavorably to
other states, and finally we outline some
simple policy options that could make the
state’s financial reports more transparent.
2011 in Review: ATitanic Beginning
In The Illinois Report 2011, we described the
fiscal situation at the beginning of the year in
a chapter titled “Titanic and Sinking: The Illi-
nois Budget Disaster.”4 We used the Fiscal
Futures Model5 to quantify a variety of policy
scenarios for closing a Fiscal Year 2011
budget gap of about $11 billion. We illus-
trated that to balance the budget only with
revenue increases would have required dou-
bling the Illinois income tax or sales tax; to
balance the budget only with borrowing
would mean that by 2014 debt service would
consume all the receipts from the personal
income tax; and to balance the budget only
by reducing expenditures would require cuts
of 26 percent. We also illustrated the impos-
sibility of doing nothing but wait for the
economy to grow. Even if personal income,
corporate income, and general sales taxes re-
turned to their 2008 peak levels in inflation-
adjusted dollars, state revenue would
increase by only about $2.8 billion (net of
revenue transfers to local government), far
short of the amount needed to close the
budget gap. The “Titanic” chapter also
showed that if the state continues to spend
more than it receives, unpaid bills could
amount to nearly $40 billion by the end of FY
2013, with an associated payment delay of
more than five years. In 2022, the backlog
would be on the order of $230 billion and the
payment delay would exceed 30 years. All in
all, Illinois had little choice but to raise taxes.
The January 2011Tax Increase and
Spending Cap
Facing a mounting cash flow crisis, in mid-
January 2011 the General Assembly took
advantage of a short political window—
during which lame-duck legislators could
vote on unpopular legislation without fear
of electoral reprisal—to enact a temporary
increase in the state personal and corpo-
rate income tax rates. The legislation also
included a cap on General Funds expendi-
tures and authorization for new borrow-
ing. Governor Quinn signed these into law
shortly after legislative approval:
• An increase in the personal income tax
rate from 3 percent to 5 percent through
2014 (effective January 1, 2011). The rate
then falls to 3.75 percent through 2024,
and 3.25 percent after that.
• An increase in the corporate income tax
rate from 4.8 percent to 7 percent
through 2014 (effective January 1, 2011).
The rate then drops to 5.25 percent
through 2024, and back down to 4.8 per-
cent after that.6
• A cap on General Funds spending
growth of 2 percent per year for fiscal
years 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015. Because
scheduled and non-discretionary in-
creases in pension contributions and
debt service are more than 2 percent, the
effective cap on non-pension, non-debt
spending like Medicaid and school aid is
closer to 1 percent per year. (Note also
that the cap only applies to General
Funds, which represent about half of the
total state budget.)
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4 Dye, Hudspeth and Merriman, The Illinois Report
2011, Institute of Government and Public Affairs,
University of Illinois pp. 28-38.
5 The Fiscal Futures Model starts with past and
current amounts for a broad measure of the
state budget, broken down into a number of
revenue and expenditure categories that are
consistently defined over time. The statistical
relationship for each budget category and
selected economic or demographic “driver”
variables is estimated. Those relationships are
combined with projections of future values of
the driver variables to make projections of the
fiscal variables. See: http://igpa.uillinois.edu/
fiscalfutures.
6 Illinois also imposes a personal property tax
replacement tax of 2.5 percent on the corporate
income tax base. This was unaffected by the new
legislation.
• Authorization to borrow $3.7 billion to
make the required payment for FY 2011
pensions with that debt to be paid off
over eight years.
Immediately after the January 2011 policy
changes were enacted, the Fiscal Futures
Model was used to project Illinois’ budget
gap before and after the changes.7 The con-
clusion from these projections was that the
January 2011 policy changes significantly
reduced—but did not eliminate—the pro-
jected budget gaps. Instead of projected
gaps growing steadily from $12 billion in
FY 2012 to $29 billion in FY 2022, the tax
increases and spending caps decreased the
projected FY 2012 gap to the range of $4
billion to $10 billion.8 Even with the new
taxes and spending caps, the budget crisis
in Illinois was worse than the $4 billion-
$10 billion budget gap projection because:
• As of December 31, 2010 the state had
$6.5 billion in unpaid bills from the
prior 2½ years. The backlog was not ad-
dressed by the January 2011 (or any sub-
sequent) legislation.
• Because the 2 percent growth cap is
specified in terms of General Funds, it is
still possible to increase spending more
than 2 percent by shifting expenditures
to non-General Funds.
• The January 2011 projections optimisti-
cally assumed expenditures will grow
only 2 percent even after the cap expires.
Historical rates of expenditure growth
have generally exceeded 2 percent.
• Fiscal Futures Project calculations do
not take account of pension liabilities
that will be unfunded even if Illinois
makes the statutorily required pension
payments.
• The $4 billion-$10 billion gaps will have
to be dealt with somehow, causing addi-
tional problems.
• Longer payment backlogs will in-
crease service costs as some vendors
stop doing business with the state
and others raise prices to compensate
for the delay.
• New borrowing will mean new debt
service obligations in future years.
• Worsening underfunding of pension
obligations will increase future gaps.
• Revenue from the new tax rates
might be lower than projected be-
cause businesses or workers could
leave the state to avoid the higher
burden. Others might decide against
moving into Illinois, diminishing the
state’s future economic growth.
The bottom line is that the fiscal crisis in
Illinois is far from over, even after the tax
increases.
Subsequent Budgetary Events and Actions
There have been a number of proposals for
new revenue and cost savings since the tax
increase in January 2011. But compared to
the size of the state’s budget imbalance,
the receipts or savings—if realized—are
relatively modest.
1. FY 2011 (July 1, 2010 - June 30, 2011,
with an “extended lapse period” until
December 31, 2011, during which bills
accrued during the fiscal year may be
paid):
• In December, 2010 the state securitized
its tobacco bonds for $1.5 billion (a
one-time revenue source for FY 2011).9
• Pension restructuring legislation af-
fecting current employees was pro-
posed in the spring but failed to pass.10
• Gambling expansion was proposed,
but not approved in FY 2011.
• Just before the end of FY 2011, Illinois
issued $4 billion in pension bonds to
pay its required contribution. Illinois
has not yet made its required FY 2012
contribution.
2. FY 2012 (July 1, 2011 to June 30, 2012):
• In July, a private company began
managing the Illinois State Lottery. In
its proposal, the company said it will
generate an additional $1.1 billion to
$1.5 billion more than what the state
had originally projected the lottery





















in more detail later


































would earn through the next five
years.11
• In August, after the national debt
ceiling crisis and ratings downgrade,
Moody’s—a major credit rating
agency—issued a special statement
on the dire state of Illinois finances.
• In early August, Illinois’ Republican
leaders held a press conference to
state their opposition to further bor-
rowing.
• In September, the Illinois State Toll
Highway Authority board voted
unanimously to pass a $12 billion, 15-
year capital plan to expand and mod-
ernize the tollway. Tolls will increase
87 percent.12
• Also in September, Governor Quinn
announced plans to lay off thousands
of state workers and close seven
mental health and correctional facili-
ties in response to the reduced
budget.13 In October, an arbitrator
ruled that the governor’s layoffs
would violate prior agreements made
with the American Federation of
State, County, and Municipal Em-
ployees (AFSCME). In addition, the
plans for facilities closures were
being challenged.14 On November 29,
2011 the governor and legislators
reached a last-minute agreement to
keep facilities open and prevent lay-
offs by shifting money from special
funds into the General Funds.15
As illustrated by these events, after the
January legislation very few changes have
been made that would help bring Illinois
to solvency. Perhaps political leaders and
the public believe that the tax increase and
spending caps are solving the state’s fiscal
problems. To determine whether that is the
case, we used the Fiscal Futures Model to
project revenue and expenditures into the
future for four possible scenarios. As we
demonstrate in the pages ahead, solving
Illinois’ budgetary imbalance is going to be
a very difficult struggle for the coming
decade.
New Consolidated Budget Projections from
the Fiscal Futures Model
We present the latest budget projections
from the Fiscal Futures Model for four possi-
ble scenarios: (a) assuming current law, i.e.,
the increased tax rates are really temporary,
and will be phased out beginning in 2015;
(b) assuming that the higher tax rates re-
main indefinitely; (c) assuming that the
spending growth rate can be limited to the
inflation rate; (d) maintaining higher tax
rates and limiting spending growth to infla-
tion. Each of these scenarios shows that
budgetary deficits will continue to be a
problem in the years ahead, but the state’s
finances will be more stable if the higher tax
rates remain in place beyond 2015.
Scenario A: Consolidated budget gap
projections under current law
The Fiscal Futures Model projects growth
rates for a number of separate spending
and revenue categories of the consolidated
funds budget.16 We use this model and the
latest available data to estimate Illinois’ cur-
rent and future fiscal situation. The October
2011 version of the Fiscal Futures Model
(using the most current data available as
this was written) uses revised, but not yet
final, data for FY 2011 and updated esti-
mates for FY 2012.17 In compiling numbers
for FY 2012, we have used the most current
available estimates from the Commission
on Government Forecasting and Accounta-
bility (COGFA), the Illinois Office of the
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more detail on data
and methods.
17 Fiscal Year 2012 does not end until July 2012, so
it is not yet known what the final, actual receipts
and expenditures will be or what the “lapse
period” for final payments will be. FY 2010 and
2011 lapse periods were extended from two
months to six months past the end of the fiscal
year. The Comptroller’s Detailed Annual Report for
FY 2010 is not available (as of December 1,
2011). FY 2011 data is available on the
Comptroller’s website drilldown but since the
lapse period is not over until December 31,
expenditure numbers for FY 2011 are still
changing and are often revised.
Comptroller, and the Governor’s Office of
Management and Budget (GOMB). How-
ever, not all agencies and receipt categories
have estimated total budgets from all funds
(as opposed to General Funds) available.
Therefore, in some cases we have had to es-
timate based on past trends.
Illinois’ four-year, 2 percent cap on spend-
ing growth applies to General Funds ex-
penditures. However, debt service and
pension fund contributions from General
Funds are scheduled to grow by more than
2 percent. So, to remain within the con-
straints of the spending cap, we estimate
that non-debt General Funds spending
may grow by a maximum of
• 0.8 percent in FY 2013,
• 1.1 percent in FY 2014, and
• 0.6 percent in FY 2015.18
General Funds spending represents less
than half of total spending in the 380-fund
consolidated Illinois budget used in the Fis-
cal Futures Model. The General Funds share
of total spending varies widely across the
categories of expenditure—from zero per-
cent for employee health care spending to
95 percent for corrections spending.19
Since the spending caps apply only to a
fraction of the total budget, it is quite pos-
sible that they will not be binding. When
spending starts to grow beyond the limits
set on the General Funds, parts of the
budget could be moved into the non-Gen-
eral Funds. If this happens, spending will
continue to grow at the same underlying
rate. Instead of this pessimistic (but plausi-
ble) possibility, the model projections for
FY 2013-15 assume that the General Funds
portion of each spending category really
grows only by the allowable 0.8 percent,
1.1 percent, or 0.6 percent maximum each
year while the non-General Funds portion
grows at the rate estimated for that cate-
gory from historical evidence. After 2015,
growth rates estimated from historical data
are applied.
The long-term projections of the budget
gap from the Fiscal Futures Model are
shown by the blue line in Figure 1. If the
higher tax rates are phased out beginning
in 2015, the consolidated-funds budget gap
is projected to rise from just under $3 bil-
lion in 2012 to almost $13 billion in 2023.
Note the big jump in the projected deficit
when the personal income tax rate drops
to 3.75 percent in 2015 from 5 percent in
2014.20 Figure 1 illustrates the important
point that the fiscal crisis in Illinois is far
from over despite large tax increases and
tight spending caps.
Institute of Government & Public Affairs
Figure 1
ProjectedGap in Consolidated BudgetWith andWithout
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Source: IGPA Fiscal Futures Model, with information as of November 6, 2011
18 The corresponding share for FY 2012 was also less than 2 percent, but 2012
spending is estimated directly from budget documents and not projected by
the model.
19 See Figure 9 below and Dye, Hudspeth and Merriman, “Why Ignore Almost
Half of the Illinois State Budget Picture? Consolidation of General and Special
Fund Reporting.” Institute of Government and Public Affairs, University of
Illinois, July 2011, http://igpa.uillinois.edu/system/files/Fiscal percent20
Futurespercent20Budgetpercent20Transparency percent20Report.pdf.
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Scenario B: Consolidated budget gap
projections with no drop in tax rates
The red line in Figure 1 shows the projected
budget gap if the higher income tax rates—5
percent personal and 7 percent corporate—
are retained past the 2015 expiration date. If
the tax rates were to remain at the higher
levels, this would substantially reduce, but
not eliminate, the projected consolidated
budget gap for Illinois. The deficit would be
more than $4 billion in FY 2015, would
grow each year, and exceed $6.5 billion in
FY 2022. The growing budget gap results
from the fact that the model projects rev-
enue to grow more slowly than spending—
a difference of about 1 percent per year.
Scenarios C & D: Keep the growth rate in
spending down to the inflation rate
The spending growth cap applies just to
General Funds spending and expires after
FY 2015. What if spending growth could be
constrained across the entire consolidated
budget and further into the future? The pro-
jected inflation rate in the Fiscal Futures
Model varies slightly from year to year, but
averages about 2.1 percent per year for the
next 10 years.
Figure 2 shows Fiscal Futures Model projec-
tions of the consolidated budget gap assum-
ing: the same impact of the cap on General
Funds spending through 2015 that was as-
sumed in preparing the estimates used for
Figure 1, scheduled changes in debt service
and pension spending, and the same drivers
of revenue growth in all years; General
Funds spending growth is held to the infla-
tion rate after 2015; and other spending
grows at only the inflation rate both before
and after 2015.
The green line in Figure 2 illustrates Sce-
nario C. If the higher tax rates are allowed
to expire, the projected gap in the consoli-
dated budget would reach $7 billion in FY
2016 and then, because inflation-only
growth in spending would be less than rev-
enue growth, the gap would decline each
year and reach $3.5 billion in 2022. The or-
ange line represents Scenario D with both
higher taxes and spending constraint. If
spending growth is held to inflation and the
higher income tax rates are not phased out,
the consolidated budget is projected to
roughly balance in 2019 and reach a surplus
of $3 billion in 2022.
Keeping the growth rate of all spending
down to 2.1 percent per year would require
severe cuts in state programs. Over the long
term, wages tend to grow at a higher rate
than inflation, and only by doing so can the
real standard of living grow over time. The
model assumes that state contributions to
pensions grow as currently scheduled by
law, but that schedule will result in growing
unfunded liabilities unless there are major
changes to pension law. Medical costs,
which show up in the state budget both as
Medicaid and contributions for employee






a further drop in
the income tax rate




ProjectedGap in Consolidated Budget if FutureGrowth in
All Non-Pension, Non-Debt Spending CanbeHeld to the









Tax rates kept up




































Source: IGPA Fiscal Futures Model, with information as of November 6, 2011
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health care, have grown well in excess of ei-
ther the price inflation rate or the growth in
other government spending and are pro-
jected to continue to do so.21
As brutal as it would be to hold overall
spending growth to the inflation rate and to
maintain tax rates at or near current levels,
it is reassuring to see projections that sug-
gest Illinois’ fiscal problems are potentially
manageable over the next 10 years. In The
Illinois Report 2011, we estimated that the
state budget gap was so massive that cor-
recting it with a change in any single policy
instrument would be impossible. The big
tax increases enacted in January 2011, the
spending cuts that have been made so far,
and the additional cuts necessary to achieve
the General Funds spending caps have
whittled the gap from impossibly large to
potentiallymanageable. That’s progress.
Before FY 2011, the state did very little long-
range fiscal planning, but legislation en-
acted in January 2011 mandated multi-year
forecasting and planning for some elements
of Illinois’ budget. In April, the Commis-
sion on Government Forecasting and Ac-
countability (COGFA) issued multi-year
budget projections for General Funds rev-
enue and spending for FY 2012 thru FY
2014. It is a very important step forward,
but as we discuss in the following sections,
General Funds are not the total state
budget. This fact is not obvious because
looking at Illinois’ budget picture is like
looking through a dark and distorted glass.
The state could do a much better job of pre-
senting budget information in a clear,
broad, and consistent way to help Illinois
move toward fiscal solvency.
BudgetTransparency: Benefits and Measures22
We believe that a focus on the seemingly
arcane topic of budgetary reporting may be
an important facet of fiscal reform and re-
covery. State budgets in Illinois and other
states are massive, complicated documents
that use idiosyncratic and sometimes
inconsistent accounting conventions.
Moreover, budget information is not al-
ways presented in a timely manner or an
easily accessible form. Worse, confusion
follows transactions that can flow through
multiple funds or accounting conventions
that change from one year to the next.
The General Funds budget represents less
than half of state receipts and spending—a
fact that is not always well-understood. Pre-
senting clear budget categories—without
fund shifts and transfers—increases trans-
parency. As we have explained, the Fiscal
Futures Model uses a broad and time-consis-
tent budget concept—consolidated expen-
ditures—which prevents distortion by
idiosyncratic accounting practices. Without
an accurate assessment of the problem, it is
more difficult to make progress toward a
solution. If voters are to be asked to make
difficult choices, elected officials have an
obligation to provide clear and transparent
information about the actual history and
constraints faced by the state.
It is easy to agree that complicated, hid-
den, and inconsistent budget practices are
not desirable and that greater transparency
would help create more informed policy-
making. But how does one go about meas-
uring budget transparency? A recent
report by the IGPA Fiscal Futures Project
team, Transparency in State Budgets: A
Search for Best Practices, examines budget
transparency from several perspectives.
But before presenting our own indicators
of budget transparency, we briefly review
past work by others: academic and profes-
sional studies of government budget trans-
parency, and public interest organizations’
evaluations of public access to state budg-
etary information.
Academic and professional studies of
government budget transparency
In academic literature, there are trans-
parency studies published in political
science, public administration, and
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economics journals. Most of these studies:
(a) identify desirable characteristics of the
timing or content of budget information;
(b) find measurable indicators of these; (c)
compile an overall score for each govern-
ment studied; and (d) look for a statistical
association between budget ttransparency
scores and cross-government differences in
outcomes—such as the size of the budget,
debt, or how informed the electorate is.
Empirical studies generally find that
greater transparency is associated with fa-
vorable outcomes. Almost all of the aca-
demic articles describe transparency
differences between nations. Only one
group (James Alt and co-authors) has pub-
lished academic studies on budget trans-
parency among the United States.
Using recent data from the National Asso-
ciation of State Budget Officers (NASBO)
we reconstructed an index based on the
work of Alt and co-authors with current
data.23 The criteria, number of states with a
“yes” and results for Illinois are:
• Budget is reported using generally
accepted accounting principles
(GAAP); 16 states, including Illinois,
“yes”;
• Multi-year expenditure forecasts are
used; 38 states, including Illinois,
“yes”;24
• Budget cycle is annual; 29 states in-
cluding Illinois, “yes”;
• Revenue forecasts are binding; 32
states “yes,” Illinois “no”;
• Legislative branch has or shares re-
sponsibility for revenue forecasts; 37
states “yes,” Illinois “no”;
• Appropriation bills are written by
non-partisan staff; 31 states “yes,”
Illinois “no”;
• Tax or expenditure limitations; 29
states “yes,” Illinois “no”;
• Budget requires published perform-
ance measures; 42 states, including
Illinois, “yes.”
Figure 3 shows the distribution of states by
the total number of “yes” scores for the above
criteria. Illinois’ tally of only four “yes”
scores is below 32 other states that score a
“yes” on from five to eight of the criteria.
Public interest organizations’ evaluations of
public access to state budgetary information
There are three groups that score states
based on the online accessibility of their
budget and related information: Good Jobs
First, U.S. Public Interest Research Group
(PIRG), and Sunshine Review. Figures 4-6
show the number of states given A, B, C, D,
and F grades by each of the organizations.
Compared to other states, Illinois is graded
fairly highly and earns a “C” from Good
Jobs First, a “B” from U.S. PIRG, and a “B”
from Sunshine Review.
A fourth public interest group, Truth in
Accounting, reports the average number of
days from fiscal-year end to the release of
the important Comprehensive Annual
Financial Report (CAFR). As shown in
Figure 7, Truth in Accounting groups the
states into three categories:
• “timely,” up to 179 days;
• “tardy,” 180-279 days;
• “worst,” 280 or more days, including
Illinois at 316 days.50
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Source: Dye, Hudspeth andMerriman,“Transparency in State
Budgets,”September 2011
General Funds versus special funds shares of
total spending
As we have discussed above and else-
where25 our study of Illinois has demon-
strated that accounting procedures that
narrow the focus of budgetary discussions
to General Funds can lead to obfuscation
and confusion, and can enable the use of
unsustainable budgetary practices. Using
this insight, we developed four original in-
dicators of fiscal transparency: (a) the
share of total spending that comes from
special—as opposed to General—funds;
(b) year-to-year variation in that share; (c)
the magnitude of net transfers between
General Funds and special funds; and (d)
year-to-year variation in net transfers. Be-
cause General Funds are more commonly
reported, using special funds or transfer-
ring funds back and forth can cloud the
budget picture. Year-to-year changes in
special funds or in fund transfers may alter
the frame of reference and confuse budget
watchers.
Table 1 and Figures 8 and 9 show Illinois’
scores on these measures. Note that for all
four measures, lower scores imply greater
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Source: Dye, Hudspeth andMerriman,“Transparency in State
Budgets,”September 2011
Figure 6





















































Source: Dye, Hudspeth andMerriman,“Transparency in State
Budgets,”September 2011
transparency and higher scores imply less
budget transparency.
Figure 8 and the first row of Table 1 show
that the special-fund share of total spend-
ing in Illinois is far below the 50-state aver-
age in each year and eighth-lowest among
states overall. Illinois’ relatively good score
on this measure of transparency may be
misleading. The other three indicators sug-
gest a lack of transparency. Inspection of
the year-to-year changes in Figure 8 and
the second row of Table 1 indicate that
variation in the special-fund share of the
state of Illinois budget is extraordinary.
Only three states have more average vari-
ability—i.e., less transparency—than Illi-
nois.
Figure 9 and the third row of Table 1 indi-
cate that Illinois has extremely large
within-year transfers from General Funds
to special funds (Measure C). While the 50-
state average is about 2 percent, Illinois
variation ranges from 8 percent to 17 per-
cent and averages around 13 percent. Illi-
nois is ranked 49th among the 50 states on
the special-General fund transfer share.
The final row of Table 1 summarizes Meas-
ure D, the year-to-year variation in the
transfer share. Large year-to-year jumps,
as seen in Figure 8, result in Illinois being
ranked 39th on this measure of non-trans-
parency, among the worst in the nation.
The importance of broad and consistent
consolidated reporting to promote budget
transparency
Illinois scores poorly on academic and other
measures of budget transparency. This lack
52















Fiscal FutureMeasures of Fiscal Transparency for Illinois
(Higher scores imply more confusing budgets thus lower transparency)
Average
Illinois
Score FY Illinois’ Illinois’
‘97-09 Rank Transparency
A. Special Fund Share of Total Spending .458 8 High
B. Variation in Special Fund Share .061 47 Very Low
C. Special-General Fund Transfer Share of Total .127 49 Very Low
D. Variation in Inter-Fund Transfer Share .032 39 Low
Source: Dye, Hudspeth andMerriman,“Transparency in State Budgets,”September 2011
Figure 8





















































Source: Dye, Hudspeth andMerriman,“Transparency in State
Budgets,”September 2011
of transparency may have contributed to
the difficult fiscal situation in which
Illinois now finds itself. More importantly,
the lack of clear, accessible information
about the Illinois budget and fiscal condi-
tion may inhibit constructive discussions
about potential remedies. The Fiscal Fu-
tures Project has developed both concep-
tual and concrete proposals for reformed
reporting of Illinois’ budget. We believe
that the advantages of transparency sup-
port our call for Illinois to adopt a broad-
based, time-consistent framework for
reporting its revenue and expenditures.
If Illinois is to effectively deal with its fis-
cal challenges it will need widespread
compromise and cooperation. Trust among
groups with differing political agendas
and constituencies will be required. Clear,
accurate and complete budgetary informa-
tion will enable discussions that can lead
to trust and mutually acceptable sacrifice
for the good of the state.
Toward consolidation and greater
transparency26
The state of Illinois has hundreds of sepa-
rate funds created to monitor the receipt
and use of public money. There are four
General Funds, seven highway funds, five
debt-service funds, nine bond-financed
funds, and hundreds of others, including
nearly 300 federal and state trust funds.
Some important categories of spending,
such as transportation, do not come out of
the General Funds budget. Other agencies’
budgets use a combination of General
Funds and special funds. Over time, the
use of non-General Funds has increased,
and today General Funds represent less
than half of the total budget. Still, most
discussion of Illinois’ budget concentrates
only on the four General Funds.
If properly used, fund accounting can help
policymakers determine the use of scarce
resources and bolster public trust. How-
ever, the complexity and multiplicity of
funds can also be used to mystify, obscure
and even distort true budgetary actions.
Reporting only the General Funds budget
—while increasingly using non-General
Funds—allows important budgetary
choices, such as changes in transportation
spending, to be made with little scrutiny. It
also becomes harder to monitor actual
changes in spending from one year to the
next. These limitations, in turn, make it
more difficult to foresee future budgetary
problems.
Adding more funds to budget reporting
presents a more accurate and complete
picture of the state’s fiscal situation. The
Fiscal Futures Project team created a con-
solidated funds budget that tracks 380
funds and uses historically consistent cate-
gories of spending and receipts. This view
of the budget brings important categories
of state spending—transportation, debt
service, transfers to local government, and
federal grants—into budget analysis and
discussion of priorities.
The consolidated budget also provides
more consistency over time. Assigning an
item to General Funds in one year and to a
special fund in the next does not change
total spending. But if the focus is only on









































































Source: Dye, Hudspeth andMerriman,“Transparency in State
Budgets,”September 2011
the General Funds, it would appear that
spending went down. Fiscal Futures Proj-
ect consolidated budget reporting is not af-
fected by changes in the assignment of
spending (or revenue) from General Funds
to special funds and vice-versa because it
tracks total spending, regardless of fund
assignment.
Another advantage to consolidation is that
inter-fund transfers cancel out. Transfers be-
tween General Funds and special funds can
obscure the magnitude of actual changes in
the state’s budget situation. This could be
manipulated when there is a political ad-
vantage to making the budget look bigger
or smaller. Fiscal Futures Project consoli-
dated budget framework is not distorted by
transfers because revenue and expenditures
are treated comprehensively.27
Figure 10 illustrates the difference between
the General Funds and consolidated funds
budgets with data from Fiscal Year 2010.
The General Funds share of final spending
ranges from zero for Transfers to Local
Government to 10 percent for Environ-
mental and Natural Resources, and is more
than 80 percent only for Higher Education
and Corrections. Overall, as shown in Fig-
ure 11, the General Funds share of final
spending is only 41 percent of the consoli-
dated total.
Special funds often hold federal dollars or
other earmarked revenue that comes with
strings attached. Some argue that for this
reason, non-General Funds should be ex-
cluded from budget presentations.28 We
believe non-General Funds should be
included for two reasons: (a) the legislature
could change past decisions to earmark cer-
tain revenues and (b) dollars in special
funds are important substitutes for, or com-
plements to, General Funds expenditures
and should be carefully considered in
budgetary discussions. For example, if fed-
eral dollars become available for a specific
program, such as education, they will be
placed in a specially designated fund. The
portion of the General Funds budget that is
used for education could then be reduced.
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General Funds Expenditures as a Percentage of Consolidated Funds Expenditures
Medicaid ($14.4) 47.1
K-12 Education ($9.8) 73.9
Human Services $9.3) 64.9
Transfer to Local Govt. ($5.1) 0
Transport'n & Tollway ($5.0) 1.5
Debt Service ($4.8) 0
Pensions ($3.5) 0
Higher Education ($2.5) 86.8
Employee Health Care ($1.4) 0
Mgt., Legis. & Judicial ($1.8) 49.8
Corrections ($1.2) 94.2
Public Safety & Health ($1.0) 42.3
EPA, Nat. Res. & Agric. ($0.9) 9.8
Ec. Development ($1.3) 3.8
Other Expenditures ($2.4) 55.9
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Source: Dye, Hudspeth andMerriman,“Why Ignore Almost Half of the Illinois State Budget Picture? Consolidation of General and Special Fund
Reporting,” IGPA, July 2011
Which special funds are the most impor-
tant? Adding the 22 largest non-General
Funds into reporting with the General
Funds covers more than 80 percent of total
consolidated spending. Adding 55 funds
into reporting with the General Funds cov-
ers more than 90 percent of total consoli-
dated spending. In our full report on
budget consolidation, we provide tables
that show how the General Funds budget
differs from the total budget, as well as
lists of key funds.29
Another alternative, perhaps easier to im-
plement, would be to expand the number
of General Funds to include 10 or 20 of the
largest non-transportation funds that are
currently designated as special funds.
A final note: combined or consolidated re-
porting does not mean that any accounta-
bility and control restrictions on the use of
particular funds have to be changed. It just
means that those funds would be easier to
monitor and could be subjected to more
scrutiny. It is also important to note that
with any form of budget consolidation, an-
nual monitoring is necessary to maintain
consistency.
Difficult Choices Ahead
The true extent of Illinois’ fiscal problems
cannot be seen with the General Funds-only
budget, which is less than half of the total.
Worse, the scope of the General Funds can
change from one year to the next with reas-
signments or transfers from special funds to
General Funds or vice versa. A broadly and
consistently defined all-funds measure of
the state’s budget is needed.
Likewise, more transparent consolidated
budget reporting could help policymakers
understand the magnitude of the problems
and the difficult choices that need to be
made going forward. Consolidated budget
reporting would also make the gaps and
alternative solutions more comprehensible
to voters and help avert fiscal crises in the
future.
The Fiscal Futures Project has developed a
broad measure of the state budget that
consolidates reporting of Illinois’ four
General Funds with about 380 special
funds. This is a time-consuming exercise
requiring detailed information that is
available only after a budget year has been
completed, and is not available when the
governor is presenting or the General As-
sembly is voting on a budget for the up-
coming year. However, adding 20 to 50
other funds to the General Funds could
bring 80-90 percent of the full budget pic-
ture into view. This is not complete trans-
parency, but it would be far better than the
current 40 percent that the General Funds
represent of the consolidated funds total.
























Consolidated Funds Budget for Illinois
toGeneral Funds, General Funds plus
22 Funds, andGeneral Funds plus 55
Funds, FiscalYear 2010
Dye, Hudspeth andMerriman,“Why Ignore Almost Half of the
Illinois State Budget Picture? Consolidation of General and Special




















Add 22 largest funds
(84% of consolidated)






Using the consolidated funds budget con-
cept, the Fiscal Futures Model estimates that
the state’s budget gap is (a) currently on the
order of $4 billion; (b) will jump to $10 bil-
lion in FY 2016 after the income tax rates are
scheduled to go down; (c) will rise each year
after that if spending growth exceeds rev-
enue growth as historically has been the
case; and (d) will reach about $13 billion in
FY 2023. The actual budget problem is
worse because these estimates do not ac-
count for the current backlog of unpaid bills,
increased borrowing or other consequences
of dealing with the large and growing
deficit, or an unfunded pension liability that
will continue to grow without policy action.
The good news is that policy solutions to
address a budget gap on the order of $10
billion are potentially available. We esti-
mate that if the large increases in income
tax rates adopted in January 2011 are not
phased out and if the growth in total state
spending can be kept down to the consumer
price inflation rate, the budget gap could
be eliminated within 10 years.
The sobering news is there are no quick or
easy solutions for Illinois. The changes of
the past year mean that Illinois residents
and businesses are already paying higher
taxes and receiving fewer services. The tax
increase was not the instant solution that
some people thought it would be: cutbacks
and late payments will continue to affect
schools, human service providers, and
those who rely on state assistance. The
prospect of 10 years of additional belt
tightening is daunting. If the higher tax
rates are phased out when scheduled, Illi-
nois’ state of fiscal insolvency will con-
tinue for even longer than a decade.
Holding spending growth to the inflation
rate might sound fairly painless, but
higher pension and debt service costs will
take a good chunk of that and it is hard to
imagine medical costs not growing in ex-
cess of the inflation rate, further squeezing
other types of spending. Bringing Illinois’
budget into balance will impose great po-
litical, economic, and human costs for
many years to come.
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The sobering
news is there
are no quick or
easy solutions
for Illinois.
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